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Abstrat: Reent mobile equipment (as well as the norm IEEE 802.21)
now oers the possibility for users to swith from one tehnology to another
(vertial handover). This allows exibility in resoure assignments and, on-
sequently, inreases the potential throughput alloated to eah user.
In this paper, we design a fully distributed algorithm based on trial and
error mehanisms that exploits the benets of vertial handover to nd fair
and eient assignment shemes. On the one hand, mobiles gradually update
the fration of data pakets they send to eah network based on a value
alled reperussion utility they reeive from the stations. On the other hand,
network stations ompute and send reperussion utilities to eah mobile that
represent the impat eah mobile has on the ell throughput.
This reperussion utility funtion is losely related to the onept of
marginal ost in the priing literature. Both the station and the mobile
algorithms are simple enough to be implemented in urrent standard equip-
ment.
Based on tools from evolutionary games, potential games, repliator dy-
namis and stohasti approximations, we analytially show the onvergene
of the algorithm to solutions that are eient and fair in terms of through-
put. Moreover, we show that after onvergene, eah user is onneted to a
single network ell whih avoids ostly repeated vertial handovers.
∗
A study of alloation games has been inluded.
2 P. Couheney, C. Touati, B. Gaujal
Several simple heuristis based on this algorithm are proposed to ahieve
fast onvergene. Indeed, for implementation purposes, the number of itera-
tions should remain in the order of a few tens. We nally provide extensive
simulation of the algorithm in several senarios.
Key-words: Distributed Algorithms, Hybrid Wireless Networks, Evolu-
tionary Games, Potential Games, Repliator Dynamis, Vertial Handover,
Fairness, Stohasti Approximation.
INRIA
Un algorithme distribué pour une assoiation
utilisateur-réseau eae et équitable dans les
réseaux sans ls multi-tehnologiques
Résumé : Les équipements mobiles réents (tels que dénis dans la norme
IEEE 802.21) permettent aux usagers de basuler d'une tehnologie à l'autre
(e que l'on nomme handover vertial). Plus de souplesse est autorisée dans
l'alloation des ressoures et, par onséquent, ela augmente potentiellement
les débits alloués aux usagers.
Dans et artile, nous onevons un algorithme distribué qui proède
par tâtonnement pour obtenir une assoiation utilisateur-réseau eae et
équitable, an d'exploiter les bénées du handover vertial. D'une part, les
mobiles mettent à jour pas à pas la proportion de paquets de données qu'ils
envoient sur haque réseau à partir d'une valeur transmise par la station de
base. D'autre part, les stations de base alulent et envoient ette valeur aux
mobiles. Cette valeur, appelée reperussion utility  représente l'impat que
haque mobile a sur le débit global du réseau.
Cette fontion d'utilité est à rapproher de l'idée du oût marginal dans
la littérature sur la tariation. Aussi bien l'algorithme de la station de base
que elui du mobile sont susamment simples pour être implémentés dans
les équipements standards atuels.
À partir de méthodes des jeux évolutionnaires, des jeux de potentiel,
de la dynamique de répliation, et des approximations stohastiques, nous
montrons de manière analytique la onvergene de l'algorithme vers une
solution eae et équitable en terme de débit. De plus, nous montrons
qu'une fois l'équilibre atteint, haque utilisateur est onneté à un unique
réseau e qui permet de supprimer le oût du handover vertial.
Plusieurs heuristiques reposant sur et algorithme sont proposées an
d'obtenir une onvergene rapide. En eet, pour des raisons d'ordre pratique,
le nombre d'itérations doit demeurer de l'ordre de quelques dizaines. Nous
omparons alors la qualité des solutions fournies dans divers sénarios.
Mots-lés : Algorithmes distribués, réseaux sans-ls hétérogènes, inter-
onnetion de réseau, théorie des jeux évolutionnaires, jeux de potentiels,
dynamique de répliation, handover vertial, équité, approximation stohas-
tique.
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heney, C. Touati, B. Gaujal
1 Introdution
The overall wireless market is expeted to be served by six or more major
tehnologies (GSM, UMTS, HSDPA, WiFi, WiMAX, LTE). Eah tehnology
has its own advantages and disadvantages and none of them is expeted to
eliminate the rest. Moreover, radio aess equipment is beoming more and
more multi-standard, oering the possibility of onneting through two or
more tehnologies onurrently, using the norm IEEE 802.21. Swithing be-
tween networks using dierent tehnology is referred to as vertial handover.
This is urrently done in UMA, for instane, whih gives an absolute priority
to WiFi over UMTS whenever a WiFi onnetion is available. In this paper,
in ontrast, we address the problem of omputing an eient assoiation by
providing a distributed algorithm that an be fair to all users or eient in
terms of overall throughput. Here are the theoretial ontributions of the
paper.
- First, we propose a distributed algorithm with guaranteed onvergene to a
non-ooperative equilibrium. This algorithm is based on an iterative meh-
anism: at eah time epoh the mobile nodes adapt the proportion of the
tra they send on eah network, based on some values (aled reperussion
utilities in the following) they reeive from the network. This work is in line
with some reent work on learning of Nash equilibria (see, for instane, [1℄
[2℄).
- Seond, based on tools from potential games, we show that, by appro-
priately setting up the reperussion utilities, the resulting equilibria an be
made eient or fair.
- Last, we show that the obtained equilibrium is always pure: after onver-
gene, eah user is assoiated to a single tehnology.
To validate our results, we propose several pratial implementations
of the algorithm and assess their performane in the pratial setting of a
geographial area overed by a global WiMAX network overlapping with
several loal IEEE 802.11 (also alled WiFi) ells. We suppose that eah
user an multi-home, that is to say split her tra between her loal WiFi
network and the global WiMAX ell, in order to maximize her reperussion
utility (to be dened later).
The integration of WiFi and UMTS or WiFi and WiMAX tehnologies
has already reeived some attention in the past.
There is a family of papers looking for solutions using Markov or Semi-
Markov Deision Proesses [3, 4℄. Based on Markovian assumptions upon
the inoming tra, these works provide with numerial solutions, so as
to optimize some average or disounted reward over time. Yet, beause
of the omplexity of the system at hand (the equations of the throughput
in atual wireless systems are not linear, and not even onvex), important
simplifying assumptions need to be made, and the size of the state spae
quikly beomes prohibitive to study real systems. Moreover, these methods
INRIA
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require to preisely know the harateristis of the system (e.g. in terms
of bandwidth ahieved in all ongurations, interferene impat of one ell
over the neighboring ones, rate of arrivals), data that are hardly available in
pratie.
Our approah is rather orthogonal as we seek algorithms that onverge
towards an eient alloation, using real-time measurements rather than
o-line data. Suh an approah follows game theory frameworks. There has
been reent work that, based on evolutionary games [5℄, provide with opti-
mal equilibria. Evolutionary games [6, 7℄, or the losely-related population
games, are based on Darwinian-like dynamis. The evolutionary game lit-
erature is now mature and inludes several so-alled population dynamis,
whih model the evolution of the number of individuals of eah population as
time goes by. In our ontext, a population an be seen as a set of individuals
adopting the same strategy (that is to say hoosing the same network ell
in the system and adopting idential network parameters). Reent work [5℄
have shown that, onsidering the so-alled repliator dynamis, an appropri-
ate hoie of the tness funtion (that determines how well a population is
adapted to its environment) leads to eient equilibria. However they do
not provide with algorithms that follow the repliator dynamis (and hene
onverge to the equilibria). Additionally they do not justify the use of evo-
lutionary games. Indeed, suh games assume a large number of individuals,
eah of them having a negligible impat on the environment and the tness
of others. This assumption is not satised here, where the number of ative
users in a given ell is on the order of a few tens. The arrival or departure
of a single one of them hene signiantly impats the throughput alloated
to others. As the number of players is limited, we are hene dealing with
another kind of equilibria, namely the Nash Equilibria.
The third trend of this artile onerns Nash equilibria learning meh-
anisms. In the ontext of load balaning, a few algorithms (see, for in-
stane [1, 2℄) have been shown to onverge to Nash Equilibria. Interestingly
enough, it has been pointed out that this lass of algorithms has similar
behavior and onvergene properties as repliator dynamis in evolutionary
game theory. It is to be noted that the main weakness of these algorithms is
that they may onverge to mixed strategy Nash equilibria, that is to say to
equilibria where eah user randomly piks up a deision at eah time epoh.
Suh equilibria are unfortunately not interesting in our ase, as they amount
to perpetual handover between networks.
Finally, there is a growing interest in measuring or analyzing the e-
ieny of Nash Equilibria. The most famous onept is ertainly the prie
of anarhy [8℄. Let us also mention the more reent SDF (Selsh Degra-
dation Fator) [9℄. We will show in the following that the Nash Equilibria
our algorithm onverges to are loally optimal with respet to these two ri-
teria. In addition, it has interesting fairness properties. Indeed, we show
how our algorithm an be tuned so as to onverge to α-fair points (dened
RR n° 6653
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in ooperative game theory, see [10℄), for arbitrary value of the parameter
α. This wide family of fairness riteria inludes in partiular the well-known
max-min fairness and proportional fairness and an be generalized so as to
over the Nash Bargaining Solution point [11℄.
In the present paper, we hene propose to make use of the previous works
in evolutionary games on heterogeneous network, with additional fairness
onsiderations, while proposing methods based on works on Nash learning
algorithms that an be implemented on future mobile equipments. In addi-
tion, our work present a novel result whih is that our algorithm onverges
to pure (as opposed to mixed) equilibria, preventing undesired repeated han-
dovers between stations.
2 Framework and Model
In this setion, we present the model and the objetive of this work while
introduing the notations used throughout the paper.
2.1 Interonnetion of Heterogeneous wireless networks
We onsider a set N of mobiles, suh as mobile n an onnet to a set of
network ells, that an be of various tehnologies (WiFi, WiMAX, UMTS,
LTE...). The set of ells that users
1
an onnet to, depends on their geo-
graphial loation, wireless equipment and operator subsription.
2.2 User throughput and ell load
By throughput, we refer to the rate of useful information available for a user,
in a given network, sometimes also alled goodput in the literature.
The throughput obtained by an individual on a network depend on both
her own parameters and the ones of others. These parameters inlude ge-
ographial position (interferene and attenuation level) as well as wireless
ard settings (oding shemes, TCP version, to ite a few). In previous pa-
pers [3, 4℄, the authors disretize the ells of networks into zones of idential
throughput (see Fig 1). This means that users in the same zone will reeive
the same throughput. Here, we an onsider that eah user is in its own
zone
2
. The set of users onneted to a network is alled the load of the
network.
More formally, we suppose that eah user has a set of network ells she
an onnet to denoted by In. An ation sn for user n is the hoie of a ell
i ∈ In. Then, we denote by s the vetor of users ations s = (sn)n∈N , and
all it an alloation of mobiles to networks.
1
In the following we use the term users and mobiles interhangeably.
2
unlike in the ited papers, we are not onstrained by the size of the system that is
inreasing with the number of zones.
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A
B
WiMAX ell
Zone 2
Zone 1
WiFi ell
Figure 1: An heterogeneous wireless system onsisting of a single MAN
(Metropolitan Area Network, e.g. WiMAX) ell and a set of partly overlap-
ping LAN (Loal Area Networks, e.g. WiFi) hot-spots (in grey). As user
B (in zone 1) is loser to the WiMAX antenna, it an use a more eient
oding sheme than A (in zone 2) (for instane QAM 16 instead of QPSK).
Zones are represented with a dash line, as opposed to ells, with full lines.
Then, for eah alloation s, the load of network i is denoted by ℓi(s) ∈
{0; 1}N , and is suh that ℓin(s) = 1 if user n takes ation i, 0 otherwise. The
throughput un(ℓ
i(s)) of user n taking ation i is a funtion depending only
of the vetor of load of ell i. With these notations, the throughput reeived
by n when she takes deision sn is un(ℓ
sn(s)).
2.3 Pure versus mixed strategies
As opposed to multi-homing between WiFi systems (see [12, 5℄), multi-
homing between dierent tehnologies (e.g. WiFi and WiMAX) indues
several ompliations: the dierent tehnologies may have dierent delays,
have dierent paket sizes or oding systems,... and re-onstruting the
messages sent by the mobiles may be hazardous. Hene, while eah user
an freely swith between the networks ells she has aess to, we aim at
algorithms that onverge - after a transitional state - to equilibria in whih
eah user uses a single network (so as to avoid the umbersome handover
proedure). These are alled pure strategy equilibria (see Setion 3.4).
Yet, during the onvergene phase, eah mobile is using mixed strate-
gies
3
. Then, the experiened throughput needs to be onsidered in terms of
3
The formal denition is given in Setion 3.4.
RR n° 6653
8 P. Couheney, C. Touati, B. Gaujal
expetations. In this ase, qn is a vetor of probabilities where qn,i is the
probability for mobile n hooses ell i ∈ In. The global strategy set is the
matrix q = (qn)n∈N , while the hoie Sn(q) is now a random variable suh
that P(Sn(q) = i) = qn,i. It follows that the expeted throughput reeived
by user n is E[un(ℓ
Sn(q)(S(q)))], where S(q) = (Sn(q))n∈N .
2.4 Eieny and Fairness
In our approah, we onsider elasti or data tra. Then, the Quality-of-
Servie (QoS) experiened by eah mobile user is its experiened throughput.
We are hene interested in seeking equilibria that are optimal (in the sense
of Pareto) in terms of throughput. Suh equilibria is a strategy q suh that
one annot nd another strategy q′ that inreases the expeted through-
put of a user without dereasing that of another one: ∀q′ 6= q,∃n ∈ N s.t.
E[un(ℓ
Sn(q′)(S(q′)))] > E[un(ℓ
Sn(q)(S(q)))]⇒ ∃m ∈ N ,E[um(ℓ
Sm(q′)(S(q′)))] <
E[um(ℓ
Sm(q)(S(q)))].
We design a fully distributed algorithm that onverges to points whih
are not only Pareto optimal but also α- fair. The lass of α-fair points [10℄,
ahieves
max
q
∑
n∈N
E[Gα(un(ℓ
Sn(q)(S(q))))] with Gα(x)
def
=
x1−α
1− α
. (1)
In the ase of pure strategies, for eah mobile n suh that Sn = i,
E[un(ℓ
i(S))] = un(ℓ
i(s)). So, we aim at building an algorithm that on-
verges to an alloation s∗ that reahes
max
s
∑
n∈N
Gα(un(ℓ
i(s))).
When α = 0, the orresponding solution is a soial optimum. When α
tends to one, the solution is a proportional fair point (or Nash Bargaining
Solution) and when α tends to innity, it onverges to a max-min fair point.
The parameter α hene allows exibility in hoosing between fully eient
versus fair alloation, while ensuring Pareto optimality.
Finally, it is well-known that selsh behavior in the use of resoures
(networks) may lead to ineient use, in ase of ongestion for example. To
irumvent this, we introdue some reperussion utility funtions that are
notied to users. Thus, instead of ompeting for throughput, we onsider
an algorithm reeting a non-ooperative game between users that ompete
formaximizing their reperussion utility. We will give an expliit losed-form
of the reperussion utility funtion in Setion 3.2. As in the throughput ase,
the reperussion utility on a ell only depends on the load on that ell. We
denote by rn(ℓ
sn(s)) the reperussion utility reeived by user n (as for the
throughput, the reperussion utility reeived by that user also depends on
INRIA
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the hoies of the other mobiles of the system, as reeted in the alloation
vetor s). In the ase of mixed strategies, the expeted reperussion utility
is E[rn(ℓ
Sn(S))]. The study of suh games is given in the next setion.
3 Alloation Games Related to Potential Games
This setion is devoted to the formal study of alloation games. After den-
ing what is an alloation game in Setion 3.1, we introdue the reperussion
utilities in Setion 3.2 what leads to a new game that is haraterized in Se-
tion 3.3. Finally, we show the useful property that this game is a potential
game (Setion 3.4).
3.1 Alloation Games
We onsider a normal-form game (N ,I,U) onsisting of a set N of players
(|N | = N), player n taking ations in a set In ⊂ S (|In| = In), where S is
the set of all ations. Let us denote by sn ∈ In the ation taken by player n,
and s = (sn)n∈N ∈ I =
⊗N
n=1 In. Then, U = (Un)n∈N refers to the utility
or payo for eah player: the payo for player n is Un(s1, . . . , sn, . . . , sN ).
By denition, an alloation game is a game suh that the payo of a
player when she takes ation i only depends on the set of players who also
take ation i. One an interpret suh a game as a set of users who share a
ommon set of resoures S, and an ation vetor orresponds to an alloation
of resoures to users (hene the name of these games).
We dene the load on ation (or resoure) i by ℓi(s) ∈ {0; 1}N as a vetor
suh that ℓin(s) = 1 if player n take ation i, 0 otherwise. When there is no
ambiguity, we will simplify the notation and use ℓ = ℓi(s). We denote by
ℓsn(s) the load on the ation taken by player n, and we denote the payo for
player n by un(ℓ
sn(s))
def
= Un(s1, . . . , sn, . . . , sN ).
Hene, alloations games are a wider lass of games than ongestion
games where the payo of eah player depends on the number of players
adopting the same strategy [13℄. They represent systems where dierent
users aessing a given resoure may have a dierent impat.
3.2 Reperussion utilities
We build a ompanion game of the alloation game, denoted (N ,I,R). The
new player utilities, alled reperussion utilities are built from the payos of
the original game, aording to the following denition:
Denition 1 (alloation game with reperussion utilities). Let us onsider
the reperussion utility for player n to be:
RR n° 6653
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rn(ℓ
sn(s))
def
= un(ℓ
sn(s)) −
∑
m6=n:sm=sn
(um(ℓ
sm(s)− en)− um(ℓ
sm(s))) ,
where en denotes the vetor whose entries are all 0 but the n
th
one, whih
equals 1.
An alloation game with reperussion utilities is a game whose payos
are reperussion utilities.
The utilities dened in this manner have a natural interpretation: it
orresponds to the player's payo (un(ℓ
sn(s))) minus the total inrease in
payo for all users impated by the presene of a given user on a given
ommodity (
∑
m6=n:
sm=sn
[um(ℓ
sm(s)− en)− um(ℓ
sm(s))]). This is more obvious in
the following equivalent formulation.
Remark 1. An equivalent formulation of the reperussion utilities is:
rn(ℓ
sn(s)) =
∑
m:ℓsnm =1
um(ℓ
sn(s))−
∑
m6=n:ℓsnm (s)=1
um(ℓ
sn(s)− en).
3.3 Charaterization of Alloation Games with Reperussion
Utilities
We now give a haraterization of a payo that is a reperussion utility.
Proposition 1. An alloation game (N ,I,R) is an alloation game with
reperussion utilities if and only if ∀ℓ,∀n,m ∈ N s.t. sm = sn,
rn(ℓ)− rn(ℓ− em) = rm(ℓ)− rm(ℓ− en). (2)
Proof. Suppose that r is a reperussion utility, then there exists a payo u
suh that:
rn(ℓ) =
∑
ℓk=1
uk(ℓ)−
∑
k 6=n:ℓk=1
uk(ℓ− en).
Then, denote
A =

∑
ℓk=1
uk(ℓ− em)−
∑
k 6=n:ℓk=1
uk(ℓ− en − em)

 .
Then,
rn(ℓ)− rn(ℓ− em) =
∑
ℓk=1
uk(ℓ)−
∑
k 6=n:ℓk=1
uk(ℓ− en)−A
=
∑
ℓk=1
uk(ℓ)−
∑
k 6=m:ℓk=1
uk(ℓ− em)−A
= rm(ℓ)− rm(ℓ− en).
INRIA
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Conversely, onsider an alloation game (N ,I,R) suh that Eq. 2 is
satised. Consider an ation i and ℓ the vetor of load on ation i. Let K
def
=∑
n∈N ℓn is the number of players taking ation i. Further, let (a(k)), 1 6
k 6 K be the subsripts of all players taking ation i. If there are K suh
players, then ℓ =
∑K
k=1 ea(k). Then, we laim that, for any permutation σ
of {1, . . . ,K}:
K−1∑
k=0
ra(k+1)(ℓ−
k∑
j=1
ea(j)) =
K−1∑
k=0
ra(σ(k+1))(ℓ−
k∑
j=1
ea(σ(j))). (3)
Indeed, note that, from Eq. 2:
ra(k+1)

ℓ− k−1∑
j=1
ea(j)

− ra(k+1)

ℓ− k∑
j=1
ea(j)

 =
ra(k)

ℓ− k−1∑
j=1
ea(j)

− ra(k)

ℓ− k−1∑
j=1
ea(j) − ea(k+1)

 .
Therefore:
ra(k)

ℓ− k−1∑
j=1
ea(j)

+ ra(k+1)

ℓ− k∑
j=1
ea(j)

 =
ra(k+1)

ℓ− k−1∑
j=1
ea(j)

+ ra(k)

ℓ− k−1∑
j=1
ea(j) − ea(k+1)

 .
Hene, for any k, the sum
∑
ra(k+1)(ℓ −
∑k
j=1 ea(j)) remains unhanged if
one swaps a(k) and a(k+1) (elementary transposition). Then, Eq. 3 results
from the fat that any permutation σ an be deomposed in a nite number
of elementary transpositions.
We now onstrut a payo u as follow: for any n suh that ℓn = 1, let us
dene:
un(ℓ)
def
=
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
ra(k+1)(ℓ−
k∑
j=1
ea(j)).
Then,
∑
ℓm=1
um(ℓ)−
∑
m6=n:ℓm=1
(um(ℓ− en)) =
K−1∑
k=0
ra(k+1)(ℓ−
k∑
j=1
ea(j))−
K−2∑
k=0
rb(k+1)(ℓ− en −
k∑
j=1
eb(j)).
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Note that the sequene a is idential to sequene b with the additional
element n. From Eq. 3, we an hoose a permutation σ suh that a(σ(1)) = n.
Then:
∑
ℓm=1
um(ℓ)−
∑
m6=n:ℓm=1
(um(ℓ− en))
=
K−1∑
k=0
ra(σ(k+1))(ℓ−
k∑
j=1
ea(σ(j)))−
K−1∑
k=1
ra(σ((k+1))(ℓ− en −
k∑
j=2
ea(σ(j)))
=
K−1∑
k=1
ra(σ(k+1))(ℓ− ea(σ(1)) −
k∑
j=2
ea(σ(j))) + ra(σ(1))(ℓ)−
K−1∑
k=1
ra(σ((k+1))(ℓ− en −
k∑
j=2
ea(σ(j)))
= rn(ℓ).
Hene (N ,I,R) is the alloation game with reperussion utilities asso-
iated to the (N ,I,U) alloation game.
From Prop. 1, we onlude that alloation games with reperussion util-
ities are a speial subset of alloation games. The results presented in the
following are hene valid for any alloation game suh that Eq. 2 is satised.
Example 1. Let M be the payo matrix of a two-player game. This amounts
to saying that the rst (resp. seond) player hooses the line and the seond
hooses the olumn. The payo for the rst player is given by the rst (resp.
seond) omponent.
M =
(
(a,A) (b,B)
(c, C) (d,D)
)
.
It follows from Proposition 1 that this is a game with reperussion utilities
if and only if a = A + b − C and d = D + c − B. Then, one an hek the
interesting property that there neessarily exists a pure Nash equilibrium (for
instane (a,A) is a Nash equilibrium if a > c and A > B).
3.4 Alloation Games with Reperussion Utilities are Poten-
tial Games
In this setion, we show that, given an alloation game, the game with reper-
ussion utilities (1) admits a potential funtion and (2) this potential equals
the sum of the payos for all players in the initial game. This appealing
property is exploited in the next setion to show some strong results on the
behavior of the well-known repliator dynamis on suh games.
Consider an alloation (N ,I,U) and its ompanion game (N ,I,R). We
rst assume that players have mixed strategies. Hene a strategy for player
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n is a vetor of probability qn = (qn,i)i∈In , where qn,i is the probability for
player n to take ation i (i.e. qn,i > 0 and
∑
i∈In
qn,i = 1). The strategy
domain for player n is ∆n
def
= {0 6 qn,i 6 1, s.t.
∑
i∈In
qn,i = 1}. Then, the
global domain
4
is ∆ =
⊗N
n=1∆n and a global strategy is q
def
= (qn)n∈N . We
say that q is a pure strategy if for any n and i, qn,i equals either 0 or 1.
We denote by S the random vetor whose entries Sn are all independent
and whose distribution is ∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈ In, P(Sn = i) = qn,i. The expeted
payo for player n when she takes ation i is fn,i(q)
def
= E[rn(ℓ
i(S))|Sn = i].
Then, her mean payo is fn(q)
def
=
∑
i∈In
qn,ifn,i(q). We an notie that fn,i(q)
only depends on (qm,i)m6=n and it is a multi-linear funtion of (qm,i)m6=n.
The next theorem laims that the alloation game with reperussion util-
ities is a potential game. Potential games were rst introdued in [14℄. The
notion was afterward extended to ontinuous set of players [15℄. In our ase,
it refers to the fat that the expeted payo for eah player derives from a
potential funtion. More preisely, we show that fn,i(q) =
∂F
∂qn,i
(q), where
F (q)
def
=
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈In
qn,iE[un(ℓ
i(S))|Sn = i]. (4)
It is interesting to notie the onnetion between fn,i(q) whih is the expeted
reperussion utility, and F (q) whih refers to the sum of expeted payos in
the initial game. A strategy that inreases the expeted reperussion utility
of a player, yields to a marginal inrease of the potential.
Theorem 1. The alloation game with reperussion utilities is a potential
game, and its assoiated potential funtion is F , as dened in Eq. 4.
Proof. Let us rst dierentiate funtion F :
∂F
∂qn,i
(q) = E[un(ℓ
i(S))|Sn = i] +
∑
m6=n
qm,i
∂E[um(ℓ
i(S))|Sm = i]
∂qn,i
.
4
Notie that ∆ is a polyhedron.
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In fat, it is lear that
∂E[um(ℓ
j(S))|Sm = j]
∂qn,i
= 0 if j 6= i, and
∂E[un(ℓ
i(S))|Sn = i]
∂qn,i
=
0. To simplify the notations, we omit the index i. Then,
∂F
∂qn
(q) = E[un(ℓ(S))|Sn = i] +
∑
m6=n
qm
∂
∂qn
∑
ℓ
um(ℓ)P(ℓ(S) = ℓ|Sm = i)
= E[un(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]+∑
m6=n
qm
∑
ℓ
um(ℓ)
(
P(ℓ(S) = ℓ|Sm = i, Sn = i)− P(ℓ(S) = ℓ|Sm = i, Sn 6= i)
)
= E[un(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]+∑
m6=n
∑
ℓ
um(ℓ)
(
P(ℓ(S) = ℓ, Sm = i|Sn = i)− P(ℓ(S) = ℓ+ en, Sm = i|Sn = i)
)
= E[un(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]−
∑
m6=n:Sm=Sn
(
E[um(ℓ(S)− en)|Sn = i]− E[um(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]
)
= E[rn(ℓ(S))|Sn = i]
= fn,i(q).
Remark 2. By adding a large onstant to all payo u, the reperussion
utilities beome positive. Clearly, this has no impat on the relative potential
of alloations. The Nash Equilibria of the alloation game are also onserved.
In the following, we will assume that the reperussion utilities are positive.
4 Repliator dynamis and algorithms
In this setion, we show how to design a strategy update mehanism for all
players in an alloation game with reperussion utilities that onverges to
pure Nash Equilibria. We will study in the next setion (Setion 4.4) their
eieny properties.
4.1 Repliator Dynamis.
We now onsider that the player strategies vary over time, hene q depends
on the time t: q = q(t). The trajetories of the strategies are desribed
below by a dynamis alled repliator dynamis. We will see in setion 4.2
that this dynamis an be seen as the limit of a learning mehanism.
Denition 2. The repliator dynamis [6℄[7℄ is (∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In):
dqn,i
dt
(q) = qn,i
(
fn,i(q)− fn(q)
)
. (5)
We say that qˆ is a stationary point (or equilibrium point) if (∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In):
dqn,i
dt
(qˆ) = 0.
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In partiular, qˆ is a stationary point implies ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In, qˆn,i = 0 or
fn,i(qˆ) = fn(qˆ).
Intuitively, this dynamis an be understood as an update mehanism
where the probability for eah player to hoose ations whose expeted pay-
os are above average will inrease in time, while non protable ations will
gradually be abandoned.
Let us notie that the trajetories of the repliator dynamis remain
inside the domain ∆. Also, from [15℄, the potential funtion F is a strit
Lyapunov funtion for the repliator dynamis, that means that the potential
is stritly inreasing along the trajetories outside the stationary points.
In this ontext, a losed set A is Lyapunov stable if, for every neigh-
borhood B, there exists a neighborhood B′ ⊂ B suh that the trajetories
remain in B for any initial ondition in B′. A is asymptotially stable if it
is Lyapunov stable and is an attrator (i.e. there exists a neighborhood C
suh that all trajetories starting in C onverge to A). The existene of a
strit Lyapunov funtion yields the following:
Remark 3. The aumulation points of the trajetories of the repliator
dynamis are stationary points.
Intuitively, the limit points (that are onneted) of the same trajetory
must have the same value for the Lyapunov funtion. But the set of limit
points is invariant for the dynamis, hene the Lyapunov funtion is non-
inreasing on this set. The remark follows.
Proposition 2. All the asymptotially stable sets of the repliator dynamis
are faes of the domain. These faes are sets of equilibrium points for the
repliator dynamis.
Proof. We show that any set whih is not a fae of the domain is not an
attrator. This results from a property disovered by E. Akin [16℄ whih
states that the repliator dynamis preserves a ertain form of volume.
Let A be an asymptotially stable set of the repliator dynamis. Sine
the domain ∆ is polyhedral, A is inluded in a fae FA of ∆. The support
of the fae S(FA) is the set of subsripts (n, i) suh that there exists q ∈ A
with qn,i 6= 0 or 1. The relative interior of the fae is Int(FA) = {q ∈
F (A)s.t.∀(n, i) ∈ S(FA), 0 < qn,i < 1}.
Furthermore, it should be lear that faes are invariant under the repli-
ator dynamis. Hene on the fae FA, by using the transformation vn,i
def
=
log(
qn,i
qn,in
),∀q ∈ Int(FA), one an see that
∂
∂vn,i
dvn,i
dt
= 0,∀n ∈ N , i ∈ I.
Up to this transformation, the divergene of the vetor eld is null on
FA. Using Liouville's theorem [16℄, we infer that the transformed dynamis
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preserves volume in Int(FA). This implies that the set of limit points of the
trajetories in Int(FA) is Int(FA) itself. By the previous remark, Int(FA) is
made of equilibrium points. By ontinuity of the vetor eld, all the points in
fae FA are equilibria. Finally, sine A is asymptotially stable, this means
that A = FA.
We say that s = (sn)n∈N is a pure Nash Equilibrium if ∀n ∈ N , ∀s
′
n 6=
sn, Un(s1 . . . sn . . . sN ) > Un(s1 . . . s
′
n . . . sN ).
Remark 4. Let q be a pure strategy. We denote by in the hoie of player
n suh that qn,in = 1. Then, a pure strategy q is a Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to:
∀n ∈ N ,∀j 6= in, fin,n(q) > fj,n(q).
The following proposition omes form a lassial result that says that
the pure Nash equilibria are asymptotially stable points of the repliator
dynamis.
Proposition 3. If a stable fae is redued to a single point, then this of
the repliator dynamis are pure Nash equilibria of the alloation game with
reperussion utilities.
Proof. Let qˆ be an asymptotially stable point. Then qˆ is a fae of ∆ by
Proposition 2 (i.e. a 0-1 point), with, say qˆn,i = 1. Assume that qˆ is not a
Nash equilibrium. Then, there exists j 6= i suh that fj,n(qˆ) > fi,n(qˆ). Now,
onsider a point q′ = qˆ + ǫen,j − ǫen,i. Notie that fn,i(q
′) = fn,i(qˆ) sine q
′
and qˆ only dier on omponents onerning user n. Then starting in q′, the
repliator dynamis is
dqn,i
dt
(q′)= q′n,i(fn,i(q
′)− ((1 − ǫ)fn,j(q
′) + ǫfn,i(q
′))
= (1− ǫ)(fn,i(qˆ)− ((1− ǫ)fn,j(qˆ) + ǫfn,i(qˆ))
=−ǫ(1− ǫ)(fn,j(qˆ)− fn,i(qˆ))
6 0,
and
dqn,j
dt
(q′) = −
dqn,i
dt
(q′) > 0.
For all users m 6= n, ∀u ∈ Im, q
′
m,u ∈ {0, 1}, then
dqm,k
dt
(q′) = q′m,k
(
fn,k(q
′)−
∑
u
q′m,u(fn,u(q
′))
)
= 0.
Therefore starting from q′, the dynamis keeps moving in the diretion
en,j − en,i (or stays still) and does not onverge to qˆ. This ontradits the
fat that qˆ is asymptotially stable.
Proposition 4. Alloation games with reperussion utilities admit at least
one pure Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Alloation games with reperussion utilities admit a potential that is
a Lyapunov funtion of their repliator dynamis. Sine the domain ∆ is
ompat, the Lyapunov funtion reahes its maximal value inside ∆. The
argmax of the Lyapunov funtion form an asymptotially stable sets A of
equilibrium points. By Proposition 2, these sets are faes of the domain
(hene ontain pure points). All points in A are Nash equilibrium points by
using a similar argument as in Proposition 3. This onludes the proof.
4.2 A Stohasti Approximation of the Repliator Dynam-
is.
In this setion, we present an algorithmi onstrution of the players' strate-
gies that selets a pure Nash equilibrium for the game with reperussion
utilities. A similar learning mehanism is proposed in [2℄. We now assume a
disrete time, in whih at eah epoh t, players take random deision Sn(t)
aording to their strategy qn(t), and update their strategy prole aording
to their urrent payo. We look at the following algorithm (∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In):
qn,i(t+ 1) = qn,i(t) + ǫ rn(ℓ
Sn(S)) (1Sn=i − qn,i(t)), (6)
where Sn = Sn(t), ǫ > 0 is the onstant step size of the algorithm, and
1Sn=i is equal to 1 if Sn = i, and 0 otherwise. Reall that we assume that
rn(ℓ
Sn(S)) > 0. Then, if ǫ is small enough, qn,i remains in the interval [0; 1].
Strategies are initialized with value q(0) = q0. The step-size is hosen to
be onstant in order to have higher onvergene speed than with dereasing
step size.
One an notie that this algorithm is fully distributed, sine for eah
player n, the only information needed is rn(ℓ
Sn(S)). Furthermore, at every
iteration, eah player only need the utility on one ation (whih is randomly
hosen). In appliative ontext, this means that a player does not have to
san all the ation before update her strategy, what would be ostly.
Below, we provide some intuition on why the algorithm is haraterized
by a dierential equation, and how it asymptotially follows the repliator
dynamis (5). Note that we an re-write (6) as:
qn,i(t+ 1) = qn,i(t) + ǫ b(qn,i(t), Sn(t)).
Then, we an split b into its expeted and martingale omponents:
b(qn,i(t))=E[b(qn,i(t), Sn(t))]
ν(t) = b(qn,i(t), Sn(t))− b(qn,i(t)).
Again, (6) an be re-written as:
qn,i(t+ 1)− qn,i(t)
ǫ
= b(qn,i(t)) + ν(t).
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As ν(t) is a random dierene between the update and its expetation, then
by appliation of a law of large numbers, for small ǫ, this dierene goes
to zero. Hene, the trajetory of qn,i(t) in disrete time onverges to the
trajetory in ontinuous time of the dierential equation:


dqn,i
dt
= b(qn,i), and
q(0) = q0.
Let us ompute b(qn,i) (for ease of notations, we omit the dependene on
time t):
b(qn,i) = E[b(qn,i, Sn)]
= qn,i(1− qn,i)fn,i(q)−
∑
j 6=i
qn,jqn,ifn,j(q)
= qn,i(fn,i(q)−
∑
j
qn,jfn,j(q))
= qn,i(fn,i(q)− f(q)).
Then, qn,i(t) follows the repliator dynamis.
Consider a typial run of algorithm (6) over a system made of 10 users
with 5 hoies over 10 networks. The gure displays for one user, the prob-
abilities of hoosing eah of the 5 possible hoies. As user has 5 possible
hoies, at time epoh 0, eah hoie has probability 0.2. Then, as t grows,
all the probabilities exept one, tend to 0.
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Figure 2: Convergene of the probability values for eah of the 5 possible
hoies of one user.
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4.3 Properties of the algorithm.
The algorithm is designed so as to follow the well-known repliator dynamis.
Furthermore, the stohasti aspet of the algorithm provides some stability
to the solution: whereas the deterministi solution of a repliator dynam-
is may onverge to a saddle point, this annot happen with the stohasti
algorithm. The use of reperussion utilities provides a potential to the om-
panion game and it is known that the potential is a Lyapunov funtion for
the repliator dynamis, hene the potential is inreasing along the trajeto-
ries. The following theorem aggregates the main results about the algorithm
applied on reperussion utilities.
Theorem 2. The algorithm (6) weakly onverges to a set of pure points
that are loally optimal for the potential funtion, and Nash equilibria of the
alloation game with reperussion utilities.
Proof.  The algorithm is a stohasti algorithm with onstant step size.
From Theorem 8.5.1 of Kushner and Yin [17℄, we infer that the algo-
rithm weakly onverges as ǫ→ 0 to the limit points of the trajetories
of an ode, whih is, in our ase, the repliator dynamis (5) (it is
a partiular ase of the theorem in whih onditions of the theorem
hold: all variables are in a ompat set and the dynamis is ontin-
uous). Furthermore, the set to whih the sequene q(t) onverges is
an asymptotially stable set of the repliator dynamis, beause unsta-
ble equilibria are avoided (the noise verify ondition of [18℄, Theorem
1). From Proposition 2, the only asymptotially stable sets of the dy-
namis are faes. Hene the algorithm onverges to faes whih are
asymptotially stable.
 We now show that the dynamis in suh a fae (denoted by F ) on-
verges almost surely to a pure point. Let qˆ(0) ∈ F . Then, the traje-
tory qˆ(t) following the algorithm stays in F . Furthermore:
E[qˆn,i(t+ 1)|qˆ(t)]
= qˆn,i(t)(qˆn,i(t) + ǫfn,i(qˆ(t))(1 − qˆn,i(t)))
+
∑
j 6=i
qˆn,j(qˆn,i(t)− ǫfn,j(qˆ(t))qˆn,i(t))
= qˆn,i(t) + ǫqn,i(fn,i(qˆ(t))− fn(qˆ(t))).
Sine at a mixed stationary point fn,i(qˆ) = fn(qˆ), then E[qˆn(t +
1)|qˆ(t)] = qˆn(t). Hene the proess (qˆn(t))t is a martingale, and is
almost surely onvergent. The proess onverges neessarily to a xed
point of the iteration qˆn,i(t+1) = qˆn,i(t)+ ǫ rn(ℓ
sn(s)) (1sn=i− qˆn,i(t)),
and the sole xed points are pure points (sine the step size ǫ is on-
stant).
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 Let (q(t))t∈N be the random proess given by the algorithm. Suppose
that it admits a losed set A of limit points that ontains no pure
points, suh that A ⊂ F , where F is the smallest fae of the domain
∆ that ontains A. Assume, for ease of notations that F = ∆ ∩ {q :
qn,i = 0}. By Proposition 2, F is a fae of ∆ that is set of stationary
points.
Denote by Aδ the δ − neighborhood of A. We suppose that δ is
small enough to ensure that Aδ does not ontain any pure point (this
is possible sine A is a losed set). Let A the set of ω suh that
∀ω ∈ A,∀δ > 0,∀T ∈ N,∃t > T s.t. q(t) ∈ Aδ. We now show that the
Lebesgue measure of A, denoted µ(A), is null. Intuitively, as the algo-
rithm goes near the fae, the probability that it follows a martingale
in the fae is losed to 1, and then the trajetory will not approah the
fae.
Let Aˆ be the set of ω suh that the martingale (in F ) qˆ(t)(ω) onverges
to a pure point for every initial ondition in F . The measure of Aˆ is
1. Let s(ω) = inf{T : ∀qˆ(0) ∈ F,∀t > T, qˆ(t)(ω) /∈ Aδ}. s(ω) is the
maximal time suh that for every initial ondition in F , the martingale
is outside Aδ. Sine F is ompat, it follows that for all ω ∈ Aˆ, s(ω)
is nite. Let Aˆ(T+) ⊂ Aˆ (resp. Aˆ(T−)) be the set of ω suh that
s(ω) > T (resp. s(ω) 6 T ). Then, µ(Aˆ(T+))→ 0 when T →∞.
 Let δ = ν
k
, where ν > 0 and k ∈ N∗. If a trajetory q(t)(ω) is suh that
there exists T with qn,i(T )(ω) <
ν
k
, then there exists a duration Tk suh
that ∀t ∈ [T − Tk;T ], qn,i(t)(ω) < ν, where r
def
= maxnmaxs rn(ℓ
sn(s)).
We now show that Tk
def
= min(T,−
ln(k)
ln(1− ǫr)
). Indeed, qn,i(t + 1) >
qn,i(t) − ǫrqn,i(t). Then qn,i(T ) > qn,i(T − Tk)(1 − ǫr)
Tk
. It follows
qn,i(T − Tk) 6 qn,i(T )(1 − ǫr)
−Tk 6
ν
k
(1− ǫr)−Tk = ν.
 Let p(ν, Tk) be the probability that q(t)(ω), at distane less than δ =
ν
k
of F at time t0, does not follow the martingale qˆ(t)(ω) dened by
qˆ(t0)(ω) = projF (q(t0)(ω)), during time Tk (hene q(t0 + Tk)(ω) an
be inside Aδ). Then:
∀k ∈ N, µ(A) 6 µ(Aˆ(T+k )) + p(ν, Tk)µ(Aˆ(T
−
k )).
Indeed, let k ∈ N and ω ∈ A. There is T with qn,i(T )(ω) 6
ν
k
. For
simpliity, suppose that T = Tk. Then, either ω ∈ Aˆ(T
+
k ), either
ω ∈ Aˆ(T−k ), either the omplementary set in A whose measure is 0. If
ω ∈ Aˆ(T−k ), then q(T )(ω) ∈ A
δ
with probability p(ν, Tk).
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We now show that, by taking an appropriate ν = ν(k), then p(ν(k), Tk)→
0, when k →∞. This, and the fat that µ(Aˆ(T+k ))→ 0 when k →∞
implies that µ(A) = 0.
 Suppose ω ∈ Aˆ(T−): let us dene dt = d(q(t), qˆ(t)) the distane be-
tween the interior trajetory, and the martingale trajetory at time t.
Then, one an hek that, under ω, dt+1 6 dt(1 + ǫr), with probabil-
ity at least 1 − p(dt) with p(dt)
def
= dt
∑N
n=1 In. Let K
def
=
∑N
n=1 In.
Indeed the vetor of ations s(q) is the same as s(qˆ) as long as ω
piks the same hoie for all players. The ontrary happens with
probability
N∑
n=1
In∑
i=1
|
i∑
k=1
qn,k(t) − qˆn,k(t)|. See Figure 3 for an illus-
tration of this. Then, the lower bound follows from the inequality
|
∑i
k=1 qn,k(t)− qˆn,k(t)| < dt.
q1 q1 + q2 + q3q1 + q2
qˆ1 qˆ1 + qˆ2 qˆ1 + qˆ2 + qˆ3
0 1
Figure 3: The thik line shows the measure of the set of all ω orresponding
to the same hoies for player 1 (with 3 hoies).
Sine d0 < ν, then dTk > ν(1+ǫr)
Tk
with probability less than p(ν, Tk)
where p(ν, Tk) = 1 −
Tk∏
t=0
(1 − p(dt)) 6 1 −
Tk∏
t=0
(1 −Kν(1 + ǫr)t). Take
ν =
(1 + ǫr)−2Tk
K
. When k → ∞, dTk goes to 0, and p(ν, Tk) goes to
0. Hene, q(t)(ω) does not follow qˆ(t)(ω) for t = 0 to t = Tk with
probability p(ν, Tk), and then an be inside A
δ
.
 Finally, the fat that the pure point attained is a Nash equilibrium
follows from Proposition 3.
One an notie that the onvergene of the algorithm to a pure point
relies on the fat that the step size ǫ is onstant. If it were dereasing, the
algorithm would onverge to an equilibrium point in a stable fae, that need
not be pure.
The ombination of both algorithm (6) and reperussion utilities provides
an iterative method to selet a pure alloation whih is stable, and loally
optimal. This an be viewed as a seletion algorithm.
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4.4 Global Maximum vs Loal Maximum for the Seletion
Algorithm.
In the previous setion, we showed that the algorithm onverges to a loal
maximum of the potential funtion. This indues that if there is only one
loal maximum, the algorithm attains the global maximum. This arises for
instane if the potential funtion is onave. Without the uniqueness of the
loal maximum, there is no guaranty of onvergene to the global maximum.
Hene, assume there are multiple loal maxima (that are pure points), whih
is ommon when the payos are random. Eah of them is an attrator for the
repliator dynamis. In this setion, we investigate the following question:
does the initial point of the algorithm belongs to the basin of attration of
the global maximum?
Sine every player has no preferene at the beginning of the algorithm,
we assume that initially, ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ In, qn,i(0) =
1
|In|
. In the following
sub-setion we show that in the ase of two players, both having two hoies,
q(0) is in the basin of attration of the global maximum. Then, in Subse-
tions 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, we give ounter examples to show that the result does
not extend to the general ase of more than two players or more than two
hoies.
4.4.1 Case of two players and two hoies
Proposition 5. In a two players, two ations alloation game with reper-
ussion utilities, the initial point of the algorithm is in the basin of attration
of the global maximum.
Proof. Both players 1 and 2 an either take ation a or b. We denote by x the
probability for player 1 to hoose a, and by y the probability for 2 to hoose
a. We denote by K = (ki,j)i,j∈{0,1} the matrix suh that ki,j
def
= F (i, j),
where F (x, y) is the potential funtion5. Then, the dynamis (5) an be
rewritten: 

dx
dt
= x(1− x)(k0,1 − k0,0 +Ky)
dy
dt
= y(1− y)(k1,0 − k0,0 +Kx),
(7)
where K = k1,1+k0,0−k0,1−k1,0. Note that in a two-player two-ation game,
there are at most two loal maxima. Suppose that in the onsidered game,
there are two loal maxima. They are neessarily attained either at points
(0, 0) and (1, 1) or at points (0, 1) and (1, 0). Without loss of generality,
we an assume the former ase. Hene, k0,0 and k1,1 are loal maxima, and
k1,1 > k0,0 + γ, where γ > 0.
5
Atually, here, the derivative of the potential is equal to the projetion of the expeted
payos on the set ∆n.
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We now dene set E and funtion V as follows:
V (x, y) = |1− x|+ |1− y|,
E = {(x, y) : x+ y > 1, 0 < x, y < 1}.
(V is atually the distane of (x, y) to the point (1, 1) for the 1-norm.) We
next show that V is a Lyapunov funtion for the dynamis on the open set
E. To prove this, it is suient to show that
L(x, y)
def
=
∂V
∂x
(x, y)
dx
dt
+
∂V
∂y
(x, y)
dy
dt
< 0.
First, note that ∀(x, y) ∈ E, V (x, y) = 2− x− y. Hene, from Eq. 7,
L(x, y) = −x(1− x)(k0,1 − k0,0 +Ky)− y(1− y)(k1,0 − k0,0 +Kx).
Let also be D the open segment {(x, y) : x+ y = 1, 0 < x, y < 1}. Trivially,
∀(x, y) ∈ D, L(x, y = 1− x) = −x(1− x)(k1,1 − k0,0) < 0. (8)
Let us nally onsider the segment
S(x0) = {(x, y) : x+ y > 1, x = x0, 0 6 y 6 1}.
Figure 4 summarizes the dierent notations introdued.
S(1
2
)
D
(∂V
∂x
, ∂V
∂y
)
E
Figure 4: Proof of Prop. 5: Summary of notations
Sine E ⊂
⋃
0<x<1
S(x), it is suient to show the negativeness of L on
S(x) for all x. Let us denote by Lx(y) the restrition of L on S(x). From
Eq. 8, we have Lx(1 − x) < 0. Furthermore, Lx(y) is a quadrati funtion
and its disriminant is 4(k1,0 − k0,0)(k1,1 − k0,1), hene is negative. So, for
all x, Lx(y) is negative (stritly). Finally, L is negative (stritly) in E and
hene non-positive in a neighborhood of E.
Therefore, V is a Lyapunov funtion for the dynamis on a neighborhood
of the open set E. More preisely, V is stritly dereasing on the trajetories
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of the dynamis starting in the set E, hene they onverge to the unique
minimum of V whih is the point (1, 1). This applies to the initial point
(0.5, 0.5).
Figure 5 illustrates this result: onsider a two player (numbered 1 and 2),
two strategy (denoted by A and B) game. Let x (resp. y) be the probability
for player 1 (resp. 2) to take ation A. While two (loal) maxima exist -
namely (1, 1) and (0, 0) - the surfae overed by the basin of attration of
the global optimum (whih is (1, 1) in this example) is greater than those of
the other one. A by-produt is that the dynamis starting in point (0.5, 0.5)
onverges to the global optimum.
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1x
y
Figure 5: An example with 2 players with 2 hoies eah. There are 2 max-
ima. The point (12 ,
1
2) is inside the attrating basin of the global maximum.
Unfortunately, this appealing result annot be generalized to more play-
ers or more ations, as exemplied in the following subsetions.
4.4.2 Extension to more than two players
Example 2. Let us onsider a three player game : (N ,I,U) with N =
{1, 2, 3}, I = {A,B}, and U = (un(i, j, k))n∈{1,2,3},i,j,k∈{A,B}, where i (resp.
j), denotes the hoie of player 1 (resp. 2). The matrix representation of
(u1, u2, u3) are given below:
(u1, u2, u3)(i, j, 1) =
(
(9, 6, 4) (5, 5, 5)
(5, 8, 1) (2, 4, 4)
)
,
(u1, u2, u3)(i, j, 2) =
(
(7, 2, 8) (5, 4, 7)
(6, 3, 3) (10, 2, 8)
)
.
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Note that this game has no pure strategies Nash equilibrium and a single
mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, whih is (x, y, z) = (1/3, 5/6, 0). The
orresponding value of the potential funtion is 87/6 = 14.5.
The reperussion utility matries are:
(r1, r2, r3)(i, j, 1) =
(
(10, 9, 10) (6, 5, 5)
(5, 5, 6) (1, 1, 4)
)
,
(r1, r2, r3)(i, j, 2) =
(
(6, 4, 8) (5, 3, 7)
(1, 3, 4) (9, 11, 14)
)
.
This game has two pure Nash equilibria, that are (x, y, z) = (1, 1, 1) and
(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0), orresponding to values of the potential funtion that are
respetively 29 and 34.
Figure 6 shows that the trajetory starting at point (12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2) onverges
to the loal maximum (x, y, z) = (1, 1, 1) instead of the global maximum
(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0). Note that the performane of the loal maximum is way
ahead that of the Nash Equilibrium in the original game.
 0
 0.5
 1 0
 0.5
 1
 0
 0.5
 1
z
y
x
Figure 6: Example with 3 players, with 2 hoies eah. The gure represents
the dynami trajetory starting from the point (x, y, z)(0) = (12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ), with
x (resp. y, z) the probability for player 1 (resp. 2, 3) to adopt ation A.
The dynamis onverges to the point (1, 1, 1) whereas the global maximum
is (0, 0, 0).
4.4.3 Extension to more than two hoies
Example 3. Let us now onsider the two player game (N ,I,U) with N =
{1, 2}, I = {A,B,C}, U = (un(i, j))n∈{1,2},i∈{A,B},j∈{A,B,C}. (Note that in
this example, only the seond player has three possible hoies).
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The payo matrix is:
(u1, u2)(i, j) =
(
(6, 3) (−3, 11) (−3, 10)
(0, 2) (−1, 1) (0, 10)
)
.
The ompanion game is:
(r1, r2)(i, j) =
(
(7, 12) (−3, 11) (−3, 10)
(0, 2) (−11, 0) (0, 10)
)
.
The original game has one single pure Nash equilibria whih is (B,C)
resulting in the value 10 for the potential funtion and no mixed strategies
equilibria exists.
The ompanion game has two pure Nash equilibria that are (A,A) and
(B,C), orresponding to values of the potential funtion of 9 and 10 respe-
tively.
Denote x the probability for player 1 to hoose ation A and y1 (resp.
y2) the probability for player 2 to hoose ation A (resp. B). Then, the
global maximum of the potential funtion is 10, and is attained when x =
y1 = y2 = 0. Figure 7 shows that the trajetory starting at point (
1
2 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 )
onverges to the loal maximum (1, 1, 0), orresponding to Nash equilibrium
(A,A) of the ompanion game, whih is ineient. Interestingly in this
example, the unique Nash equilibrium of the original game orresponds to
the global maximum of the game.
 0
 0.5
 1 0  0.33
 0.67
 1
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
y2
x
y1
Figure 7: Example with 2 players. The rst one has 2 hoies and the
seond one has 3 hoies. Here we display the 3-dimensional plot of y1 vs x
and y2 vs x. The dynamis starting in (1/2, 1/3, 1/3) onverges to the point
(1, 1, 0) whereas the global maximum is (0, 0, 0).
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5 Numerial study
This setion is devoted to implementation issues and shows the numerial
tests that were performed so as to study several possible pratial heuristis
based on the algorithm.
First, notie that in the algorithm, users only need to know the reper-
ussion utility on their urrent ell to ompute their new strategy vetor.
Also, eah base station only needs to know her own load to ompute the
reperussion utilities, hene allowing for a fully distributed algorithm.
During the exeution of the algorithm, at eah time slot (typially, frames
are sent every 40 ms for video transmission), eah user exeutes the algorithm
independently, updates her probability vetor, makes a hoie aording to
her strategy and sends a paket to the orresponding base station. Mean-
while, eah base station measures the throughputs of all mobiles onneted
to it and omputes the orresponding reperussion utilities. Then, it sends
to every user their individual reperussion utility.
One a user reahes a pure strategy, she informs all the ells she has aess
to. Eah ell waits for all users onneted to her to onverge before asking
them to monitor their reperussion utility. From then on, any variation of
the load is due to an arrival or departure in the ell. Hene, upon detetion of
a hange of her reperussion utility, eah user reruns the algorithm, starting
with a new probability vetor.
In the previous theoretial setions, onvergene of the algorithm have
been shown when the step size ǫ tends to 0. Here, we present several simple
heuristis with dierent step size omputation methods. While the onver-
gene step should be small enough to ensure onvergene, larger values are
preferable to derease the algorithm runtime. Hene, appropriate trade-os
need to be examined.
In the rst subsetion, we present the dierent heuristis (Subsetion 5.1).
We then present the senario to be simulated (in terms of number of users and
network topology) (Subsetion 5.2). To perform the tests, realisti through-
puts need to be hosen for dierent ombinations of loads, i.e. values of u(ℓi)
for eah possible load ℓi. We provide suh values in Subsetion 5.3. We then
ompare the results obtained by the dierent heuristis, in terms of eieny
(the quality of the solution) and onvergene speed (Subsetion 5.4). We
briey omment in Subsetion 5.5 on the impat of fairness on the resulting
assoiation. Finally, in Subsetion 5.6, given the best heuristi, we provide
experimental results about: the salability of the algorithm on the system
size, the adaptation to arrival or departure of a mobile, the omparison with
other poliies, and the adaptation to dierent kind of tra.
5.1 The Dierent Heuristis for the Steps
Eah heuristi atually onsists of two parts:
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A stopping test As time inreases, the probabilities of hoosing eah ation
tends either to 0 or 1. So as to speed up onvergene, we onsider thresholds
δm and δM suh that:
∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈ In,
{
qn,i(t+ 1)← 0 if qn,i(t) < δm
qn,i(t+ 1)← 1 if qn,i(t) > 1− δM .
When one of this operation is done, the strategies are normalized to remain
in the strategy set ∆, and to preserve the ondition
∑
i∈In
qn,i = 1. In the
tests, we x δm = 0.05 and δM = 0.3.
A step size omputation : dierent shemes to ompute ǫn(t) are onsid-
ered.
5.1.1 Constant Step Size (CSS)
In this heuristi, the step size is predened and onstant throughout time:
∀n ∈ N ,∀t, ǫn(t) = ǫ. For low values (CSSL), typially ǫ = 0.01, the algo-
rithm onverges in almost all ases to the optimal solution, but at the ost
of a high number of iterations. For high values (CSSH), typially ǫ = 1, the
onvergene and the optimality are not guaranteed anymore. Intermediate
values (CSSM ), typially ǫ = 0.1, are possible ompromises.
5.1.2 Constant Update Size (CUS)
At eah time epoh, eah user omputes the maximum step size so that the
hange of probabilities for all hoies, is bounded by a predened value Γ
(xed to 0.1 in the experiments):
∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈ In, abs (qn,i(t+ 1)− qn,i(t)) 6 Γ.
By bounding the update of every user, this sheme yields smooth hanges in
the strategy vetors and hene an be expeted to follow the behavior of the
dierential equations.
5.1.3 Dereasing Step Size (DSS)
The underlying idea of this sheme is to use a few iterations with large steps
before using some smaller step sizes. Indeed, a big step size lets ations
assoiated to large reperussion utilities to quikly get high probabilities of
ourrene. Sine the algorithm onverges to a Nash Equilibrium regardless
of the initial onditions, using a few large steps amounts in hanging the
initial onditions so as to get lose to extrema points, and hene to possible
pure strategies Nash Equilibria. Then, the following iterations with smaller
step sizes orrespond to a good approximation of the CSSL algorithm. These
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steps onrm (or infer) the fat that the extremal point loser to the one
obtained after the rst iterations is (or not) a Nash Equilibrium.
We onsider two variants of the dereasing step size mehanism. The
rst one is a yli dereasing step size (DSSSA) (in the experiments, ǫ =
3/(t mod 10)). During eah yle a Nash equilibrium andidate is tested.
This is inspired from simulated annealing approahes.
The seond variant (DSSCSS) is a dereasing step size phase followed by
a onstant large step size (in the experiments, ǫ = 4/t if t < 120 and ǫ = 4
otherwise). The underlying idea is that the rst phase would stabilize a er-
tain number of users. Then, a large step size should improve the onvergene
speed of the others to their respetive preferable hoies.
5.2 System Senario
We onsider a simple senario of an operator providing subsribers with a
servie available either through a large WiMAX ell or a series of WiFi hot
spots.
For eah simulation, a topology is hosen randomly, aording to 3 pa-
rameters (the number of users, the number of WiFi hot spots and the number
In of possible hoies for eah user). More preisely, for eah user:
 The rst hoie is the WiMAX ell and one of the 8 possible zones (as
dened in Setion 5.3), piked at random (uniformly).
 All other In − 1 hoies are one of the Wi ells, piked up aording
to a uniform law. As explained in Setion 5.3, we onsider that all
mobiles in a ommon Wi ell reeive the same throughput.
The strategy vetor is initialized with equal probabilities: ∀n ∈ N ,∀i ∈
In, qn,i(0) = 1/In.
5.3 Throughput of TCP sessions in WLAN and WiMAX
Computing the throughput experiened by a paket in a wireless environment
is extremely hard due to the omplexity of the physial system (as opposed
to wired system, where the physial medium is separated from the outside
world, and hene has reliable properties, the wireless link quality hanges at
every instant, due to the environment: air quality, buildings and physial
obstales, et). Therefore, atual losed formula available in the literature
were obtained using strong assumptions on the outside world and do not refer
to throughput of a single paket but of means of ows. Indeed, as the number
of pakets in any onnetion is large, the ow is usually approximated as a
uid.
In addition, the useful throughput of a onnetion, also alled goodput
depends on the network protool. Roughly speaking, two main elements
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Figure 8: Capaity of a WiFi ell as a funtion of its load (in bit/s). The
maximum is reahed with 3 users.
have strong impat on the ahieved goodput: rst is the physial system,
whih depends on the tehnology in terms both of maximum apaity and
multiplexing tehnology, seond is the transport protool. In this simula-
tion study, we onsider the ase of TCP ows for whih good throughput
approximations are available in the literature. Yet, the use of UDP ows,
or a mixture of TCP and UDP ows do not impat the performane of the
algorithm. (Note that allowing users to use either TCP or UDP protool for
their transmission amounts, in the algorithm, to onsidering an additional
zone in the network ell.)
Equations of throughput in WiFi ells Based on [19℄, we onsider that
the throughput of onnetion i is
un(ℓ
i(s)) =
LTCP
li (TDATA + TACK + 2TTBO(li) + 2TW (li))
where li =
∑
n∈N ℓ
i
n is the number of mobiles onneted to network i,
LTCP = 8000 bits is the size of a TCP paket, TACK is the raw transmission
times of TCP ACK (approximately 1.091 ms), TDATA the raw transmission
times of a TCP data paket (about 1.785 ms). Then, TW and TTBO are
the mean total time lost due to ollisions and bak-os respetively. These
depend on the ollision probability of eah paket, and hene on the load
of the network. This ollision probability an be numerially obtained via
a xed point equation given in [19℄. Figure 8 displays the throughput of a
WiFi ell, as a funtion of the load.
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Figure 9: Average performane of the heuristis
(CUS,DSSSA,DSSCSS,CSSL, CSSM and CSSH resp.) with dif-
ferent loads (with 5% ondene intervals).
WiMAX As opposed to WiFi, the WiMAX tehnology uses OFDMA mul-
tiplexing. Hene, eah user reeives a ertain number of arriers whih are
onverted into a ertain amount of throughput depending on the hosen
modulation and oding sheme, whih greatly depends on the link quality at
the reeiver side. We onsider a fair sharing in terms of arriers [20℄, i.e. if p
users are present in the WiMAX ell, eah of them will reeive NbSCarriers/p
sub-arriers, similarly to proessor sharing. Hene, the goodput experiened
by a user in zone z (orresponding to a oding sheme) is roughly the fration
1/p of the throughput she would obtain if she were alone in the ell.
For a single user within the WiMAX ell, we follow experimental values
obtained in [21℄ for IEEE WiMAX 802.16d for its eight zones:
Modulation QAM64 3/4 QAM64 2/3 QAM16 3/4 QAM16 1/2
TCP goodput 9.58 8.88 6.80 4.50
Modulation QPSK 3/4 QPSK 1/2 BPSK 3/4 BPSK 1/2
TCP goodput 3.37 2.21 1.65 1.08
5.4 Comparisons between Heuristis
Figure 9 displays the performane (in terms of global throughput) obtained
by the six heuristis (CUS,DSSSA,DSSCSS,CSSL, CSSM and CSSH
resp.) as a funtion of the total number of users N . For a given load, all
heuristis have been tested on the same topology to allow a fair omparison.
The small onstant step size (CSSL with ǫ = 0.01), provides the best
performane. It is are even tested optimal for the small values of N , up to
20.
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Figure 10: Average number of iterations before onvergene of heuristis
(CUS,DSSSA,DSSCSS,CSSL, CSSM and CSSH resp. ) for dierent
loads (with 5% ondene intervals).
Most heuristis stay within 10 % of the optimal (exept for DSSCSS
whose performane an be poor). Also note that the total apaity of the
system is less than 36 (10 * 2.6 (WiFi) + 9.58 (WiMAX)) Mbit/s. Thus
the best heuristi is always within 5 % of the optimal. Finally, it should be
noted that the medium onstant step size (CSSM) with ǫ = 0.1 is always
very lose to the best (CSSL) and that the onstant update size (CUS)
performs better and better when the number of users grows.
As for the number of iterations, it varies widely between the dierent
heuristis, even on a logarithmi sale (see Figure 10). The CUS heuristi
is a lear winner here (with an average number of iterations never above
80). Meanwhile, CSSL does not always onverge within the limit of 20,000
iterations set in the program.
Under high loads, CUS provides the best ompromise with very fast
onvergene and reasonable performane. Under light load, the onstant step
size of medium size (CSSM ) is also an interesting hoie, for its performane
is almost optimal and its number of iterations remains below 100.
5.5 Impat on Fairness
Consider the following senario: a set of 20 users, eah having 3 available
hoies among 10 ells. The WiMAX ell is numbered 0 and its 8 zones are
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numbered from 0 to 7. The set of hoies of the users are I =
{{0, 1}, {8}, {1}} {{0, 5}, {6}, {4}} {{0, 1}, {6}, {9}}
{{0, 2}, {2}, {6}} {{0, 3}, {8}, {9}} {{0, 6}, {4}, {9}}
{{0, 7}, {3}, {6}} {{0, 4}, {1}, {2}} {{0, 6}, {6}, {9}}
{{0, 5}, {3}, {4}} {{0, 6}, {3}, {1}} {{0, 7}, {9}, {6}}
{{0, 3}, {8}, {1}} {{0, 6}, {4}, {7}} {{0, 6}, {9}, {5}}
{{0, 0}, {6}, {5}} {{0, 5}, {4}, {1}} {{0, 6}, {6}, {4}}
{{0, 3}, {3}, {4}} {{0, 3}, {8}, {4}}.
The optimal assoiation sheme, for α = 0 (eient sheme) and α = 2
(fair shemes) are respetively:
A
e
= {2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2, 1, 1, 1},
A
fair
= {0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1}
resulting in throughputs of:
T
e
=0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225,
0.824, 0.824, 0.824, 2.245, 2.246, 9.58, 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225.
T
fair
=2.22, 1.225, 2.22, 1.225, 1.125, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225,
2.245, 1.225, 1.225, 2.246, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.125, 1.225.
The eient sheme ahieves a total throughput of 31.29 Mb/s. The
fair sheme suers a degradation of slightly less than 10%, with a total
throughput of 28.34 Mb/s. Yet a loser look at the gures indiates that the
eient sheme leads to high dierenes between users (user 1 only obtains
a throughput of 0.8 Mb/s while user 16 is granted 9.58 Mb/s). As for the
fair assoiation sheme, on the other hand, all users benet from through-
puts higher 1.1 Mb/s. As in bandwidth alloation mehanisms in wired
systems[11℄, the parameter α hene allows to nely tune the ompromise
between maximum global throughput and fairness between users.
To understand these dierenes, let us ompare the loads between the
assoiations:
Lwifi
e
= {3, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3}, Lwifi
fair
= {1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2}.
From Fig. 8, one an see that the maximum apaity for the WiFi ells is
obtained for a load of 3 users. Hene, the eient sheme tries to obtain
as many ells with load 3 as possible. Meanwhile, the WiMAX apaity is
maximal when its users all belong to zone 0. Hene, suh users are automat-
ially assoiated to this ell (in our ase there is only one suh user, whih
obtains a throughput of 9.58 Mb/s).
On the other hand, the fair sheme tries to nd balaned assoiation
shemes. Hene, the loads of the dierent WiFi ells are lose to one another
6
6
Note that they annot be stritly equal due to the disrete nature of the problem.
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(here ranging between 1 and 2) and the WiMAX ell is assoiated to some
users belonging to eient zones. Their number is hosen so as to obtain
similar performane as for users remaining in the WiFi ells.
Hene, while purely eient shemes produe lightly loaded WiMAX
ells (with only the users in zone 0), the fair sheme leads to more balaned
loads (here, 4 users in the WiMAX ell and about 2 users in eah WiFi ell).
5.6 Further simulations
While very small onstant step sizes provided limit points with near optimal
performane, all heuristis but CUS needed several thousand steps before
onvergene for senarios with more than 10 users and/or ells. The number
of steps for CUS never topped 100 and its limit points also proved very good
(a few perent of the optimal). All simulations reported in this subsetion
use the CUS heuristi.
5.6.1 Salability
Here, we investigate the impat of the number of mobiles and the number of
ells eah mobile an onnet to on the speed of onvergene (Figures 11,12)).
Unlike in the previous setion where the riterion of onvergene speed was
the number of iterations of the algorithm, here, we measure the average
number of handovers for a mobile before onvergene. It an be argued
that this new measure of onvergene is more relevant sine handovers are
ostly for mobiles. Figures 11,12 show that the mean number of handovers
is smaller than 20 when mobiles have 2 hoies, and smaller than 25 when
mobiles have 3 hoies, even for large numbers of mobiles.
5.6.2 Adaptation to Arrivals and Departures
The assoiation algorithm has to be run at every arrival or departure of a
user in a ell. Here, we simulate the ourrene of suh events. Typial time
sales ompare niely: while arrivals or departures of users in WiMAX or
WiFi ells our every minute or so, the assoiation algorithm onverges in
less than a seond in most ases.
In Figures 13, 14, the arrivals follow a Poisson proess. Eah inoming
mobile has a message of exponential random size to download. One unit
of time orresponds to the duration of an iteration of the algorithm. In
the seond gure, white noise may model perturbations on the ell apaity
(fading) as well as errors on the measures of the real throughput.
5.6.3 Comparison with Naive or Sub-optimal Methods
In this setion, we ompare our algorithm to naive alloation methods for
inoming mobiles.
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Figure 11: Mean number of handovers for a mobile when she has 2 hoies,
as a funtion of the total number of mobiles (full lines represent the average
measure and the upper and lower 5% ondene interval).
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Figure 12: Mean number of handovers for a mobile when she has 3 hoies,
as a funtion of the total number of mobiles.
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Figure 13: Adaptation to arrivals and departures: the heuristi smoothly
and quikly reonverges after state hange.
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Figure 14: Stability with respet to measurement errors: behavior of the
algorithm when the throughput of all ells has a white Gaussian noise with
0.45 variane.
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Figure 15: Perentage of eieny gain by using our algorithm in ompar-
ison to the xed hoie of WiFi ell for eah inoming mobile. The number
of mobiles is variable, but the number of WiFi ells is xed to 15.
Fixed Alloation to a WiFi Cell. The rst naive method for a mobile
onsists in always onneting to a WiFi ell if it is possible. It is inspired
by the only urrently deployed tehnology implementing vertial handovers
alled GAN (Generi Aess Network), also known as Unliensed Mobile
Aess (UMA). Atually, GAN only enables to swith between WLAN and
GSM/UMTS. The apaity of WLAN networks is so muh larger than the
one of GSM/UMTS networks that swithing to WLAN network whenever
possible is almost always a good hoie. That is why the network seletion of
GAN is very basi: the handset gives absolute preferene to 802.11 networks
over GSM. However, the GAN seletion sheme is unlikely to be eient
in more omplex settings, espeially when the load of WiFi ells beomes
very large and when WiFi ells ompete against WiMAX or LTE ells whose
performane are loser to WiFi than UMTS. Figure 15 shows the relative
improvement of our algorithm ompared to GAN-like approah.
Alloation to the Best Cell. As for this seond naive method, an inom-
ing mobile ats selshly: she probes all available ells and always onnets
to the one that oers the best throughput at onnetion time and does not
hange ever after. Figure (16) shows the dierene of the global throughput
when we use the both methods of assoiation. We see that our algorithm
ahieves a signiant better throughput than the selsh method. This is yet
another illustration of the fat that selsh behaviors lead to a bad use of the
resoures.
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Figure 16: Evolution of the global throughput using the assoiation algo-
rithm ("algo") and greedy probing ("selsh"). At time 0, the onguration
is the same, and the arrival proesses of users are idential in the two ases.
Sine the throughputs for mobiles are dierent in the 2 shemes, the depar-
ture times are dierent. The mean performane in this period of time is 40.1
for (algo), and 29.9 for (selsh).
Comparison with the Throughput as Payo. At last, we ompare
our algorithm when we use the reperussion utility as payos for mobiles
(Setion 3.2) whih ensures the onvergene to an loally optimal point, to
the same algorithm when the payo is equal to the throughput: rn
def
= un for
all users. See Figures 17,18 and 19. Here the gain is muh lower but both
algorithms roughly have the same onvergene time.
5.6.4 Real-Time Tra vs Elasti Tra
The question here is to know whether real time tra an be taken into
aount in the algorithm. In fat, for elasti tra, utility for users is inti-
mately related to the throughput they reeive. For real time tra like voie
or video transmission, users require a ertain level of throughput. Hene the
idea is to build a dierent utility funtion for these users.
The rst idea is to have a null utility if the throughput is under a ertain
threshold, and a utility equal to 1 otherwise. The algorithm works well with
this utility but is long to onverge beause the disontinuity auses a bang-
bang behavior of the users. This problem an be avoided by transforming
the utility funtion: under the threshold the utility is still 0, and beomes 1−
exp(−un(ℓ
sn)) above it. This provides good solutions in terms of onvergene
speed as well as a good overall utility. In Figure 20, we show the behavior
INRIA
Mobile Centri Network Assoiation Algorithm 39
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 4.5
 5
 5.5
 6
 15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50 Number of mobiles
Percentage of efficiency gain
Figure 17: Perentage of eieny gain when using reperussion utilities
instead of throughputs, when the number of mobiles varies. The ratio of the
number of WiFi ells divided by the number of mobiles is onstant and equal
to 1 over 5.
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Figure 18: Similar to Figure 17, but the number of WiFi ells varies and
the number of mobiles is onstant and equal to 30.
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Figure 19: Like Figure 18, but with a onstant number of mobiles equal to
20.
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Figure 20: Dependeny of the time of onvergene when the ratio of elasti
tra varies. The number of mobiles is 30.
of the time of onvergene of this heuristi when the ratio of real-time tra
vary. The impat of this ratio on the time of onvergene is not signiant.
5.6.5 A Dynami Senario: between Mie and Elephants
Here, we onsider that the global tra is shared by two kinds of tra alled
mie and elephants. The mouse tra orresponds to short lived onnetions
(< 1 seond) and the elephant tra to long onnetions (up to one minute).
There are relatively few elephants and a large number of mie (90%), but
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Figure 21: Tra made of 30 initial users with 90% mie. Average paket
size for elephants is 20 times the average paket size for mie. The gure
shows the total throughput when all users apply the algorithm. The average
total throughput is 39.05Mb/s.
globally, the ratio of elephant tra represents approximately 85% of the
global tra. Whereas our algorithm is well adapted to elephant tra,
sine the time of onvergene is negligible with respet to the duration of
the onnetion, it is not the ase for mie tra. In Figures 21 and 22, we
ompare two senarios, when both mie and elephants use the algorithm and
when only elephants do so (while mie always onnet to one WiFi ell). The
seond method redues the number of handovers and preserves the overall
throughput (even giving a small gain) as seen in the Figures 21 and 22.
At last, Figure 23 shows the performane gain when we apply the al-
gorithm for mie and elephants in omparison with applying it only to the
elephants. It points out the fat that both methods have a similar eieny,
but the seond ensures a low rate of handovers. It is interesting to notie
that this is independent of the ratio of mie tra. That means that the loss
of throughput due to the algorithm (whih is important when the perentage
of mie is high), is balaned by the loss of optimality of the seond method.
6 Conlusion and Future Works
In this paper, we have designed a distributed algorithm that selets an e-
ient (in terms of fairness or global throughput) network assoiation in het-
erogeneous wireless networks. Simulations show that this method is relevant,
in omparison with naive method. This opens the way to several interesting
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Figure 22: Same onguration and arrival proess as in Figure 21. In
this gure, mie are diretly alloated to the WiFi ell without applying the
algorithm. The mean throughput is 39.19Mb/s.
−1
−0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60
 Percentage of mice traffic
 Percentage of efficiency gain
Figure 23: Perentage of gain by running the algorithm for mie and ele-
phants instead of running it only for elephants as a funtion of the perentage
of mie tra ( the global tra average remains onstant).
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future works, suh as the implementation of suh methods in modern mobile
devies in ollaboration with Alatel-Luent.
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